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TAINTED PRECEDENT
Darrell A.H. Miller*
We have a common law system of constitutional
adjudication, at least in the sense that constitutional practice in the
United States relies on prior rulings rather than reasoning from
first principles in each case. If there’s controlling precedent on
point, it’s binding. Neither “inferior courts” in the federal system,
nor state courts adjudicating federal law, are permitted to start
anew with the “original public meaning” of the First Amendment
or pronounce a fresh Dworkinian “moral reading” of the Fourth.
Even the highest court in the land, the Supreme Court of the
United States, for reasons of reputation, stability, and rule of law,
does not treat every case it hears as one of first impression—its
justices work through forests of precedent (of variable density) in
reaching its decisions.
And this presents a problem that Professor Killenbeck has
identified in his article1—what happens when a reasonable, even
valuable, proposition of law is found buried deep within
problematic or even odious opinions? Unlike some civil law
countries, or even some states,2 there’s no convention in federal
constitutional law that permits someone to simply cite a legal
proposition—”racial classifications are subject to strict
scrutiny”3—completely disentangled from the factual
*

Melvin G. Shimm Professor of Law, Duke Law School. The author would like to
thank Joseph Blocher for reading and reviewing a draft of this article.
1. See generally Mark R. Killenbeck, Sober Second Thought? Korematsu
Reconsidered, 74 ARK. L. REV. 151 (2021).
2. The Supreme Court of Ohio, for instance, stipulates that its syllabus is binding.
Smith v. Klem, 450 N.E.2d 1171, 1173 (Ohio 1983) (“[I]t is well-established that the syllabus
of an opinion issued by this court states the law of the case.”). The reasoning of the opinion
may be helpful for understanding the holding, but it’s the syllabus that’s law, not the decision
that generates it. Cf. Koonce v. Doolittle, 37 S.E. 644, 645 (W. Va. 1900) (“[T]his court
only makes the more important points of law a part of the syllabus for the general information
of the legal profession and public[.]”).
3. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 220 (1995) (quoting Wygant
v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 285 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part,
concurring in judgment)) (“[R]acial classifications of any sort must be subjected to ‘strict
scrutiny[]’”).
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circumstances—or persons—that give voice to the decision. And
therein lies the problem. Sometimes the legal proposition from
an opinion—strict scrutiny—is besmirched with some fairly
obnoxious facts. Indeed, sometimes the authors, facts, reasoning,
or results are so reviled, that the opinion—whatever kernels of
wisdom it may contain—is considered anti-canonical.4 What to
do with this tainted precedent?5 This short reflection on Professor
Killenbeck’s article offers some thoughts on the topic.
CATEGORIES OF TAINTED PRECEDENT
Tainted precedent comes in a number of forms, of various
degrees of seriousness. Some precedent is tainted because of the
noxiousness of its author. Justice James Clark McReynolds was
widely known as a racial bigot and anti-Semite.6 And yet he’s the
author of two of the most significant substantive due process
cases of the mid twentieth century:7 Meyer v. Nebraska,8 which
struck down a state law forbidding German foreign language
instruction to children, and Pierce v. Society of Sisters,9 which
struck down an Oregon law requiring all children to attend public
school. These cases are often regarded as essential building
blocks in modern substantive due process jurisprudence having to
do with individual rights, like abortion, same-sex marriage, and
privacy, despite the fact they flowed from the pen of such a
personally poisonous jurist. Even the reviled Chief Justice Robert
Taney, author of the paradigmatic anti-canonical opinion, Dred
4. Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379, 386-87 (2011).
5. The description comes from Professors Fallon and Meltzer. Richard H. Fallon, Jr.
& Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction, Substantive Rights, and the War on Terror,
120 HARV. L. REV. 2029, 2077 (2007) (“Korematsu is a tainted precedent, more reviled than
respected.”).
6. Justin Driver, The Significance of the Frontier in American Constitutional Law,
2011 SUP. CT. REV. 345, 370; David E. Bernstein & Ilya Somin, Judicial Power and Civil
Rights Reconsidered, 114 YALE L.J. 591, 641 (2004).
7. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, “Who Owns the Child?”: Meyer and Pierce and the
Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 1002 (1992) (“James Clark McReynolds,
the reactionary Associate Justice, [was] a legendary bigot who hated Germans, Catholics,
and Jews, and yet authored the famous icons of liberal toleration.”).
8. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402-03 (1923).
9. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (“The fundamental theory of
liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any general power of the
state to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers
only.”).
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Scott v. Sandford, authored opinions now understood to be antimonopolist and designed to limit the outsized power of
corporations in favor of regulation.10 His decision in Bank of
Augusta v. Earle11 is frequently cited for the proposition that
corporations have no citizenship claims under the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV (later extended to the Privileges
or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).12
Some precedent is tainted because the justifications upon
which it relies are discredited, or even rejected, even though the
outcome remains supported on other grounds. Buchanan v.
Warley13 fits this model. Today, Buchanan is cited for the
laudable proposition that the Fourteenth Amendment Equal
Protection Clause prohibits a racial zoning scheme.14 But a close
read of Buchanan reveals that it is not really a full-throated
endorsement of racial equity. Buchanan actually rests on suspect
notions that economic due process rights to freely dispose of
property
trump
government-imposed
restrictions
on
alienability.15
Some precedent is tainted because, even though it expresses
a useful proposition, that proposition is not applied in the
precedential case to the ends of justice or is mired in problematic
or offensive reasoning on other issues. The Civil Rights Cases16
fit this model. The opinion is routinely cited for the state action
doctrine—a proposition that there must be a sphere of private life
separate from public life, essential for human flourishing and as a
legal bulwark against the authoritarian ambitions of government

10. See ADAM WINKLER, WE THE CORPORATIONS 95-97 (2018).
11. Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. 519, 587 (1839) (corporations cannot claim “the
rights which belong to its members as citizens of a state”).
12. JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, 1 TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS § 1:4 n.4 (3d) (citing Earle, 38 U.S. at 586-89). See also Selover, Bates &
Co. v. Walsh, 226 U.S. 112, 126 (1912) (“[I]t is well settled that a corporation cannot claim
the protection of the clause of the Fourteenth Amendment which secures the privileges and
immunities of citizens of the United States against abridgment or impairment by the law of
a State.”).
13. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
14. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1948). See David E. Bernstein, Bolling,
Equal Protection, Due Process, and Lochnerphobia, 93 GEO. L.J. 1253, 1274 (2005) (noting
that the court in Shelley “favorably cited Buchanan v. Warley, but obscured the fact that
Buchanan was a due process and not an equal protection case.”).
15. See Buchanan, 245 U.S. at 82.
16. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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actors.17 And yet, the same opinion struck down the first federal
public accommodation law in the United States as exceeding
Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment (and Thirteenth Amendment)
power.18 Even more directly in the service of racial justice, the
Civil Rights Cases contain dicta that the Thirteenth Amendment
targets not only the narrow issue of chattel slavery but also has a
“reflex character” that empowers—at minimum—Congress to
pass legislation aimed at the “badges and incidents” of slavery as
well.19 That dicta has been the predicate for some of the most
direct civil rights decisions of the Warren and Burger Courts,
including Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.20 and Runyon v.
McCrary.21
Then there are the anticanonical cases, like Dred Scott22 and
Korematsu23—cases so tainted that their citation for any
proposition other than condemnation is typically considered
intolerable. This is where Professor Killenbeck’s appeal comes
in. Is there anything in Korematsu that’s redeemable? Is the fact
that it is one of the first cases to articulate strict scrutiny for racial
classifications sufficient to rescue it—at least in that small
measure—from thoroughgoing ignominy?

RECKONING WITH TAINTED PRECEDENT

17. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936 (1982) (“Careful adherence to the
‘state action’ requirement preserves an area of individual freedom by limiting the reach of
federal law and federal judicial power.”) (citing the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3); see also
Cooper v. U.S. Postal Serv., 577 F.3d 479, 491 (2d Cir. 2009); Raithatha v. Univ. of
Pikeville, No. 7:16-CV-251-EBA, 2017 WL 4583245, at *7 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 13, 2017); cf.
Adam Liptak, Can Twitter Legally Bar Trump? The First Amendment Says Yes, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 9, 2021), [https://perma.cc/E5QU-FHUX] (citing First Amendment scholars who say
that Twitter is not a state actor bound by the First Amendment).
18. Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335 (1875). The law guaranteed that
“all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall be entitled to the full and equal
enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns, public
conveyances on land or water, theaters, and other places of public amusement; subject only
to the conditions and limitations established by law, and applicable alike to citizens of every
race and color, regardless of any previous condition of servitude.”
19. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 20.
20. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 438 (1968).
21. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 179 (1976).
22. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
23. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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In some respects, dealing with tainted precedent raises
similar questions to what we do with monuments with
troublesome pasts. 24 Do we ignore their faults and just make use
of them? Do we contextualize them? Do we create countermonuments? Do we tear them down?
For the practitioner or the judge, it feels like the question is
rather straightforward. If the legal proposition is sound, and if it
is necessary to cite the precedent for the proposition, its
problematic origins or parentage should not matter. As a scholar
of gun rights and regulation, I frequently encounter arguments,
typically from gun-rights advocates, that because gun regulation
was unquestionably used to racist ends in the past, that means all
contemporary gun regulation is racist and should be abandoned.
My response to those arguments is to say that the history of all
law in America is tainted with white supremacy. I am not about
to say that laws punishing robbery, rape, and murder should be
excised from the penal code because their history is sullied by two
centuries of express and implicit racial bias.
We should be circumspect about how the law is written. We
should be vigilant in monitoring how it is applied and enforced,
but the mere fact that it comes out of a racist past is not sufficient
to sap it of its utility. A rule that requires we abandon useful
precedent on the grounds that it is contaminated with racism
would leave us with precious little of the public good left.25 Of
course, such an answer assumes that something valuable can be
separated from the dross. Sometimes that may not be possible.
One can find something useful about a prohibition against
“badges and incidents” of slavery in the Civil Rights Cases.26 It’s
difficult to see any redeeming precedential material coming from
Dred Scott.27

24. For a slightly different take on a similar issue, see generally Justin Simard, Citing
Slavery, 72 STAN. L. REV. 79 (2020).
25. See id. at 120 (“If we look carefully enough, we could find something objectionable
about nearly every [nineteenth century] judge or opinion . . . . In a legal system built on
precedent, disregarding the decisions of all these judges is impractical.”)
26. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883).
27. Although, scholars and some judges cite Scott for gun rights positions. See, e.g.,
Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 391 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (citing Dred Scott v.
Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857)), aff’d sub nom. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570
(2008).
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That does not mean that as teachers of the law we should not
provide due acknowledgement to the problematic history of these
cases.28 And in that sense, I see Professor Killenbeck as
providing a valuable service in that regard. By exposing the lurid
history of a rightly reviled opinion, he shows that even some of
the most benighted of decisions can occasionally contain seeds of
a more just and equitable constitutional order.

28. See Simard, supra note 24, at 121-22.

